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Abstract
In this paper, we obtain tight approximation guarantee for budget-feasible mechanisms
with an additive buyer. We propose a new simple randomized mechanism with approxi-
mation ratio of 2, improving the previous best known result of 3. Our bound is tight with
respect to either the optimal offline benchmark, or its fractional relaxation. We also present
a simple deterministic mechanism with the tight approximation guarantee of 3 against the
fractional optimum, improving the best known result of
(√
2 + 2
)
for the weaker integral
benchmark.
1 Introduction
In a typical procurement setting, a buyer wants to purchase items from a set A of agents. Each
agent i ∈ A can supply an item (or provide a service) at an incurred cost of ci to himself, and
the buyer wants to optimize his valuation for the set of acquired items taking into account the
costs of items. Since agents may strategically report their costs, the setting is usually considered
as a truthful mechanism design problem.
These problems have been extensively studied by the AGT community. The earlier work
analyzed the case where the buyer’s valuation takes 0-1 values (see, e.g., [AT02]) in the fru-
gality framework, with the objective of payment minimization. A more recent line of work on
the budget-feasible mechanism design (see, e.g., [Sin10]) studies more general valuation func-
tions with a budget constraint B on the buyer’s total payment. Our work belongs to the latter
category.
The research in the budget-feasible framework focuses on different classes of complement-
free valuations (ranging from the class of additive valuations to the most general class of sub-
additive valuations), and has many applications such as procurement in crowdsourcing mar-
kets [SM13], experimental design [HIM14], advertising in social networks [Sin12]. For ex-
ample, consider an online crowdsourcing platform (like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk), where a
buyer may hire multiple workers to perform certain tasks like image labeling, text translations,
or writing consumer surveys. The central problem for these online labor markets is to properly
price each task, since the buyer is usually budget constrained, and would run out of budget
once he pays too high to the hired workers.
This setting corresponds to the most basic additive valuation of the buyer, which is the topic
of our paper. That is, we assume that every hired worker i ∈ W generates value vi ≥ 0 to the
buyer, whose value from all hired workersW equals to v(W ) =
∑
i∈W vi. Without any incentive
constraints, this naturally defines the Knapsack optimization problem:
Find workers S ⊆ A: maxS⊆A v(S) =
∑
i∈S vi, subject to
∑
i∈S ci ≤ B.
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In the budget-feasible framework, the goal is to design truthful direct-revelation mechanism
that decides (1) which workers W ⊆ A to select, and (2) how much to pay them under the
budget constraint. A mechanism is evaluated against the benchmark of the optimal solution to
the Knapsack problem.
For the above problem with the additive buyer, Singer [Sin10] gave the first 5-approximation
mechanism. Later, the result was improved by Chen et al. [CGL11] with a
(√
2+2
)
-approximation
deterministic mechanism and a 3-approximation randomized mechanism, which still remain the
best known upper bounds to the problem for nearly a decade. The best known lower bounds
are
(√
2 + 1
)
for the deterministic and 2 for the randomized mechanisms [CGL11]1. On the
other hand, Anari et al. [AGN14] studied an important special case of large markets, i.e., the
setting where each worker has vanishingly small cost (compared to the buyer’s budget), and
acquired tight bound of ee−1 .
Fractional Knapsack. Interestingly, all previous work on budget-feasible mechanisms for the
additive buyer actually obtains results against the stronger benchmark of the optimal solution to
Fractional Knapsack2, i.e., the fractional relaxation of the Knapsack problem. Indeed, Knapsack
is a well-known NP-hard problem, while its fractional relaxation admits efficient solution by a
simple greedy algorithm, and generally has much better behavior than the integral optimum.
We also compare performance of our mechanisms to the Fractional Knapsack benchmark.
Our Results. We propose two natural mechanisms that both achieve tight guarantees against
the Fractional Knapsack benchmark. Namely, we show 3-approximation guarantee for the deter-
ministic and 2-approximation guarantee for the randomized mechanisms. Given the matching
lower bound of 2 even against the weaker Knapsack benchmark, the guarantee from our ran-
domized mechanism is also tight against the standard benchmark. Our results establish clear
separation between the powers of randomized and deterministic mechanisms: no deterministic
mechanism has approximation guarantee better than
(√
2 + 1
)
, while our randomized mecha-
nism already achieves 2-approximation.
We propose a new natural design principle of two-stage mechanisms: in the first stage, we
greedily exclude the items with low value-per-cost ratios3; in the second stage, we use the simple
posted-pricing schemes, based on the values of the remaining items. Both of our randomized
and deterministic mechanisms share the first stage, which stops earlier than its analogues from
the previous work. A remarkable property of the first stage, which we call pruning (similar to
the pruning approach in the frugality literature [CEGP10, KSM10]), is that it can be composed
(in the sense of [AH06]) with any truthful follow-up mechanism that runs on the items left to
the second stage. The difference between our randomized and deterministic mechanisms lies
in the follow-up posted-pricing schemes: the randomized mechanism uses non-adaptive posted
prices with the total sum below the budget, while our deterministic mechanism employees
adaptive pricing that depends on whether previous agents accepted or rejected their posted-
pricing offers.
1.1 Related Work
A complementary concept of budget-feasible mechanism design is frugality with the objective of
payment minimization under feasibility constraint on the set of winning agents. In that frame-
work, there is a rich literature studying different systems of feasible sets, including matroid set
1There are gaps for both deterministic
[√
2+1,
√
2+2
]
and randomized
[
2, 3
]
mechanisms. As these two intervals
intersect, it is not even clear whether the best randomized mechanism is necessarily better than the deterministic
one.
2However, the lower bounds apply to the Knapsack benchmark instead of the Fractional Knapsack benchmark.
3This is essentially the main approach used in the previous work, had we continued until the set of the remaining
items becomes budget-feasible.
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systems [KKT05], path and k-paths auctions [AT02, Tal03, ESS04, CK07, CEGP10], vertex cover
and k-vertex cover [EGG07, KSM10, HKS18].
The framework of budget-feasible mechanism design was proposed by Singer [Sin10]. Be-
sides additive valuations, other more general classes of complement-free valuations also have
been studied in the literature: submodular, fractionally subadditive, and subadditive valua-
tions. Singer provided an 112-approximation mechanism for submodular valuations [Sin10].
This bound was improved to 7.91 and 8.34 for randomized and deterministic mechanisms
by Chen et al. in [CGL11], and afterward it was improved to 4 and 5 by Jalaly and Tardos
in [KT18], respectively. For fractionally subadditive valuations, Bei et al. [BCGL17] gave a 768-
approximation randomized mechanism. For the most general class of subadditive valuations,
Dobzinski et al. [DPS11] first designed O(log2 n)-approximation randomized and O(log3 n)-
approximation deterministic mechanisms. Later, Bei et al. [BCGL17] proved the existence of
O(1)-approximation budget-feasible mechanism for the subadditive buyer; however, any ex-
plicit description of such a mechanism is still unknown.
There also have been many interesting and practically motivated adjustments to the original
budget feasibility model. In particular, Anari et al. [AGN14] considered the variant with the ad-
ditional large-market assumption, i.e., that the maximal cost of each agent is small compared to
the budget, and attained tight result of ee−1 for the additive buyer. Badanidiyuru et al. [BKS12]
studied the family of online pricing mechanisms in the budget feasibility model, motivated by
practical restrictions imposed by existing platforms. Balkanski and Hartline [BH16] obtained
improved guarantees in the Bayesian framework. Goel et al. [GNS14] considered more complex
scenarios on a crowdsourcing platform, where the buyer hires workers to complete more than
one tasks. Balkanski and Singer [BS15] considered fair mechanisms (rather than incentive
compatible mechanisms) in the budget feasibility model.
2 Preliminaries
In the procurement auction, there are n items for sale, each held by a single agent i ∈ [n] with
a privately known cost ci ∈ R+ and a publicly known value vi ∈ R+ for the buyer. The buyer
has an additive valuation function v(A) =
∑
i∈A vi for purchasing a subset A ⊆ [n] of items. By
the revelation principle, we only consider direct-revelation mechanisms. Upon receiving bids
b = (bi)
n
i=1 of the claimed costs from the agents, a mechanism determines a set W ⊆ [n] of
winning agents and the payments p = (pi)
n
i=1 to them. Any mechanismM can be described by
its allocation function x(b) : Rn+ → [0, 1]n and payment function p(b) : Rn+ → Rn+. A truthful
(deterministic) mechanism satisfies the following properties, for all bids b = (bi)
n
i=1 and costs
c = (ci)
n
i=1.
• (Individual rationality and no positive transfer): pi ≥ ci if i ∈ W , and pi = 0 if i /∈W . I.e.,
each winning agent i ∈ W gets a non-negative utility of ui(bi) = pi − ci ≥ 0, and each
loosing agent i /∈W gets a utility of 0.
• (Budget feasibility): ∑i∈W pi ≤ B, for a given budget B ∈ R+.
• (Truthfulness): bidding the true cost bi = ci maximizes the utility of each agent i ∈ [n].
It is well-known (see [Mye81]) that truthfulness holds if and only if: (1) allocation function
is monotone, i.e., decreasing bid bi unilaterally cannot alter the status of agent i ∈ [n] from
loosing to winning (in case of a randomized mechanism, the allocation probability xi(b) never
increases); and (2) payment pi is the threshold/maximum bid for an agent i ∈ W to keep
winning. A universally truthful randomized mechanism is a probability distribution over truthful
deterministic mechanisms.
We denote by alg the value
∑
i∈W vi derived from a deterministic mechanism, or the ex-
pected value E
[∑
i∈W vi
]
in case of a randomized mechanism. For each agent i ∈ [n], we
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assume without loss of generality that ci ≤ B, in that agent i can never win when ci > B (due
to individual rationality and budget feasibility constraints).
If the buyer knows the private costs c = (ci)
n
i=1 of the items, he would simply select the
subset of items with the maximal total value, under the budget constraint. Let opt denote the
optimal solution to such Knapsack problem:
opt
def
= max
{xi}ni=1∈{0,1}
n
n∑
i=1
xi · vi, subject to
n∑
i=1
xi · ci ≤ B. (Knapsack)
We also consider the fractional relaxation of the problem, and define its optimum as
fopt
def
= max
{xi}ni=1∈[0,1]
n
n∑
i=1
xi · vi, subject to
n∑
i=1
xi · ci ≤ B. (Fractional Knapsack)
While opt is NP-hard to calculate, finding fopt is easy: one greedily takes the items in the
decreasing order of value-per-cost ratios
(v(1)
c(1)
≥ · · · ≥ v(n)c(n)
)
, until the budget is exhausted or no
item is left. Under our assumption that ci ≤ B for each item i ∈ [n]4, 1 ≤ foptopt ≤ 2.
We say that a mechanism is an α-approximation (with respect to the benchmark opt) if
the value of alg is always at least 1α -fraction of the value of opt corresponding to the Knapsack
problem. In this work, we mostly compare the performance of a mechanism to the stronger
benchmark fopt, i.e., the solution to the Fractional Knapsack problem.
α ≤ max
v,c,B
opt
alg
⇐ α ≤ max
v,c,B
fopt
alg
.
3 Composition of Mechanisms: Pruning
Each of our mechanisms consists of two stages, and can be described as a composition of two
consecutive mechanisms. The common first stage is called PRUNING-MECHANISM, and the pur-
pose of this is to exclude the items with low value-per-cost ratios.
PRUNING-MECHANISM
(1) Let r
def
= 1B ·max
{
vi | i ∈ [n]
}
and S(r)
def
=
{
i ∈ [n] | vici ≥ r
}
(2) While r · B < v(S(r))−max{vi | i ∈ S(r)} do:
(a) Continuously increase ratio r
(b) If vkck
≤ r, then discarda item k: S(r)← S(r) \ {k}
(3) Return pair (r, S(r))
aIf there are multiple such items, we discard them one by one in lexicographical
order; we stop discarding items, whenever Stop-Condition of While-Loop holds.
PRUNING-MECHANISM possesses a remarkable composability property: the combination of
it with any truthful follow-up mechanism M running on the output set S(r) of PRUNING-
MECHANISM is still a truthful mechanism. More concretely, the composition mechanism M =
(x,p) of PRUNING-MECHANISM with a mechanismM = (x,p) works as follows:
4Without this assumption, the gap between the two optima fopt
opt
can be arbitrary large.
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(1) Receive pair (r, S(r)) from PRUNING-MECHANISM.
(2) Run mechanismM on agent set S(r):
(a) Select the winning setW from S(r) according toM.
(b) Cap payment pi to
vi
r , i.e., pi
def
= min(pi,
vi
r ), for each winning agent i ∈W .
Lemma 1. If a mechanism M is individually rational, budget-feasible, and truthful, then so is the
composition mechanism M.
Proof. By Step (2b) in PRUNING-MECHANISM, each item i ∈ S(r) has a value-per-cost ratio
at least r, which means ci ≤ vir . Hence, capping a payment pi to vir does not break individual
rationality. MechanismM is already budget-feasible, and mechanismM can only decrease the
payment to each agent. We are only left to show thatM is truthful.
First, we claim that any agent i ∈ S(r) cannot alter the output of PRUNING-MECHANISM by
manipulating his bid, unless agent i bids too high to be included in set S(r). Formally, denote
by (r′, S′(r′)) the output under another bid c′i 6= ci, then (r′, S′(r′)) = (r, S(r)) whenever i ∈ S′.
Indeed, agent i’s bid may affect any step in PRUNING-MECHANISM only when the mechanism
is excluding him from the candidate set; given that agent i belongs to the output set, his bid
cannot change the output.
As mechanismM has a monotone allocation rule, so does the composition mechanismM.
Indeed, if a loosing agent i /∈W claims a higher cost: (1) the increased bid does not help agent
i to pass the first stage of PRUNING-MECHANISM; (2) given that agent i always gets selected in
set S(r) before and after increasing the bid, he would always loose in truthful mechanism M,
in that the pair (r, S(r)) remains the same.
The payment of pi = min(pi,
vi
r ) is exactly the threshold bid for an agent i ∈ W to keep
winning: the bid of vir is the threshold bid to pass the first stage of PRUNING-MECHANISM; the
bid of pi is the threshold bid to win in the second stage of mechanismM.
We show now several useful properties of the output (r, S(r)) of PRUNING-MECHANISM.
Lemma 2. Let i∗ ∈ argmax{vi | i ∈ S(r)} denote the highest-value item5, and let T def= S(r)\{i∗}.
Then,
(a) ci ≤ vir ≤ B for each item i ∈ S(r).
(b) v(T ) ≤ r ·B < v(S(r)).
(c) fopt ≤ v(S(r)) + r · (B − c(S(r)) < 2 · v(S(r)).
Proof. In (a): the first inequality is due to Step (2b); the second inequality holds, since ratio r
is initialized to be 1B ·max
{
vi | i ∈ [n]
}
, and never decreases during While-Loop.
To prove (b), we observe that the first inequality is a reformulation of Stop-Condition of
While-Loop. To prove the second inequality, we note that there are two possibilities that may
lead to the termination of While-Loop, and r ·B < v(S(r)) holds in both cases.
• [Increase of ratio r]. Continuous increase of r implies r ·B = v(T ) < v(S(r)).
• [Discard of an item k]. Value-per-cost ratio r is fixed before and after the discard.
Before the discard, in that Stop-Condition has not been invoked,
r ·B < v(S(r)) + vk −max{vi∗ , vk} ≤ v(S(r)).
5When there are multiple highest-value items, we break ties lexicographically.
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The second inequality in (c) directly follows from (b). We would verify the first inequality
in (c) via case analysis. Let x = (xi)
n
i=1 denote the solution to the Fractional Knapsack problem.
We have either S(r) ⊆ {i ∈ [n] |xi = 1} or S(r) ) {i ∈ [n] |xi > 0}. This claim comes as:
(1) PRUNING-MECHANISM removes items in the increasing order of value-per-cost ratios; while
(2) the greedy algorithm takes items in the decreasing order of value-per-cost ratios; and (3) in
both processes, we break ties lexicographically.
• [When S(r) ⊆ {i ∈ [n] |xi = 1}]. Observe that c(S(r)) ≤ B, and vici ≤ r for each
item i /∈ S(r). Hence, the total value of the items beyond set S(r) is ∑i/∈S(r) xi · vi ≤
r ·∑i/∈S(r) xi · ci = r · (B − c(S(r))).
• [When S(r) ) {i ∈ [n] |xi > 0}]. Clearly, c(S(r)) > B, and vici ≥ r for each item i ∈ S(r).
Then, v(S(r))− fopt =∑i∈S(r)(1− xi) · vi ≥ r ·∑i∈S(r)(1− xi) · ci = r · (c(S(r))−B).
This concludes the proof of all points (a), (b), and (c) in Lemma 2.
Mechanisms in the Second Stage. Based on Lemma 1, PRUNING-MECHANISM can be com-
posed with any follow-up truthful mechanism. In fact, we focus on the class of simple posted-
pricing mechanisms, with each mechanism parametrized6 by a set of prices (Bi)i∈S(r) subject to∑
i∈S(r)Bi ≤ B. Such a mechanism naturally satisfies individual rationality, no positive transfer,
budget feasibility, and truthfulness.
To illustrate how to analyze the approximability of a two-stage pricing scheme, and as a
warm-up exercise, we discuss below two simple mechanisms.
Warm-Up. In our first mechanism, we choose the higher-value subset of either {i∗} or T as
the winning set W , by offering price vir to each item i ∈ {i∗} or i ∈ T . As a result, we know
from Lemma 2 (c) that fopt ≤ 2 · v(S(r)) ≤ 4 ·max{vi∗ , v(T )} = 4 · alg.
4-APPROX-MECHANISM(r, S(r))
(1) Ifa vi∗ ≥ v(T ), get item i∗ by offering price vi∗r
(2) Elseb, get items T by offering price vir to each item i ∈ T
aItem i∗ will accept the offer
vi∗
r
, by Lemma 2 (a) that ci∗ ≤ vi∗r .
bEach item i ∈ T will accept the offer vi
r
, by Lemma 2 (a) that ci ≤ vir .
Our next pricing mechanism recovers the best known ratio of
(√
2+2
)
by Chen et al. [CGL11].
We justify its approximability via case analysis.
(√
2 + 2
)
-APPROX-MECHANISM(r, S(r))
(1) If vi∗ ≥
√
2 · v(T ), get item i∗ by offering price vi∗r
(2) Else,
(a) Get items T by offering price vir to each item i ∈ T
(b) Offer pricea B − v(T )r to item i∗
aNotice from Lemma 2 (b) that 0 ≤ B − v(T )
r
<
vi∗
r
.
6To obtain our 3-approximation deterministic mechanism in Section 4, we actually use an adaptive pricing
scheme. I.e., the take-it-or-leave price offered to each item i ∈ S(r) may change, depending on whether the
items that had made decisions before accepted or rejected their posted prices.
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[Case (1): vi∗ ≥
√
2 · v(T )]. Item i∗ is the only winner, hence alg = vi∗ . By Lemma 2 (c),
fopt ≤ 2 · v(S(r)) = 2 · (vi∗ + v(T )) ≤ (2 +√2) · vi∗ = (2 +√2) · alg.
[Case (2): vi∗ <
√
2 · v(T )]. There are two possibilities. First, when ci∗ ≤ B − v(T )r ,
all items in set S(r) together form the winning set W , i.e., alg = v(S(r)). By Lemma 2 (c),
fopt ≤ 2 · v(S(r)) = 2 · alg. Second, when ci∗ > B − v(T )r , only the items in set T are chosen as
the winners, i.e., alg = v(T ). Consequently,
fopt ≤ v(S(r)) + r · (B − c(S(r))) (by Lemma 2 (c))
≤ v(S(r)) + v(T ) (since c(S(r)) ≥ ci∗ > B − v(T )/r)
= v(i∗) + 2 · v(T ) (since v(S(r)) = v(i∗) + v(T ))
< (
√
2 + 2) · alg. (since vi∗ <
√
2 · v(T ) =
√
2 · alg).
When vi∗ <
√
2 · v(T ) and ci∗ ≤ B − v(T )r , the last mechanism admits a 2-approximation.
One might ask a natural question: is it possible to achieve a better trade-off between this 2-
approximation case and the (
√
2 + 2)-approximation cases? In the next section, we affirm
this guess by presenting a slightly more complicated adaptive pricing scheme, resulting in a
3-approximation deterministic mechanism.
4 Deterministic Mechanism
The warm-up mechanisms have merely a few possible outcomes, and do not adapt to the deci-
sions of the items: either the highest-value item i∗, or the remaining items T , or rarely both of
item i∗ and items T win; the posted prices (Bi)i∈S(r) are almost all equal to the maximum pos-
sible values
(
vi
r
)
i∈S(r)
. Such rigid structure hinders those pricing mechanisms from achieving
better performance guarantees than
(√
2 + 2
)
-approximation. In this section, we introduce an
improved adaptive pricing mechanism.
DETERMINISTIC-MECHANISM(r, S(r))
(1) If vi∗ ≤ 12 · v(T ), get items T by offering price vir to each item i ∈ T
(2) Else if vi∗ ≥ 2 · v(T ), get item i∗ by offering price vi∗r to i∗
(3) Else, i.e., when 12 · v(T ) < vi∗ < 2 · v(T ):
(a) Offer price Bi∗
def
= min
{
vi∗
r ,
2·vi∗−v(T )
v(S) ·B
}
to item i∗
(b) Ifa ci∗ ≤ Bi∗, offer Bi def= min
{
vi
r ,
vi
v(T ) · (B −Bi∗)
}
to each item i ∈ T
(c) Elseb, get items T by offering price vir to each item i ∈ T
aWhen ci∗ ≤ Bi∗ , item i∗ will accept offer Bi∗ .
bWhen ci∗ > Bi∗ , item i
∗ will reject offer Bi∗ , and then each item i ∈ T will accept offer Bi.
We also call by the same name DETERMINISTIC-MECHANISM the composition of two mecha-
nisms: PRUNING-MECHANISM with DETERMINISTIC-MECHANISM.
Theorem 1. DETERMINISTIC-MECHANISM is a 3-approximation mechanism (individually ratio-
nal, budget-feasible, and truthful) against the Fractional Knapsack benchmark.
Proof. Individual rationality, no positive transfer, and truthfulness are due to the pricing nature
of DETERMINISTIC-MECHANISM, Lemma 1, and Lemma 2 (a). To show budget feasibility, we
consider either Case (3b) or Case (3c) in the mechanism:
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• [Case (3b)]. ∑i∈W Bi ≤ Bi∗ +∑i∈T viv(T ) · (B −Bi∗) = B.
• [Case (3c)]. SinceW = T , we know from Lemma 2 (b) that∑i∈W vir = v(T )r ≤ B.
In the reminder of the proof, we focus on the approximation guarantee. Both of Case (1)
and Case (2) in the mechanism, in which either vi∗ ≤ 12 · v(T ) or vi∗ ≥ 2 · v(T ), are easy to
analyze. In either case, alg = max
{
vi∗ , v(T )
}
and thus
fopt < 2 · v(S(r)) = 2 · (vi∗ + v(T )) ≤ 3 ·max{vi∗ , v(T )} = 3 · alg,
where the first inequality comes from Lemma 2 (c), and the second inequality holds since either
2 · vi∗ ≤ v(T ) or vi∗ ≥ 2 · v(T ).
From now on, we safely assume that 12 ·v(T ) < vi∗ < 2·v(T ). Conditioned on either ci∗ ≤ Bi∗
or ci∗ > Bi∗ , we are only left to deal with Case (3b) and Case (3c).
[Case (3b) that ci∗ ≤ Bi∗]. Let U def= {i ∈ T | ci ≤ Bi} be the set of winners in set T , then
alg = vi∗ + v(U). We have ci > Bi for each item i ∈ (T \ U). Note that Bi < vir for each item
i ∈ (T \U), since otherwise item i would accept price Bi and would actually get in set U . Thus,
ci > Bi =
vi
v(T ) ·
(
B −Bi∗
)
for each item i ∈ (T \ U) and
c(S(r)) ≥
∑
i∈(T\U)
ci >
∑
i∈(T\U)
Bi =
v(T \ U)
v(T )
· (B −Bi∗). (1)
By Lemma 2 (c), fopt ≤ v(S(r)) + r · (B − c(S(r))). We plug inequality (1) into it and get
fopt
(1)
<v(S(r)) + r ·
(
v(U)
v(T )
· B + v(T \ U)
v(T )
· Bi∗
)
<v(S(r)) ·
(
1 +
v(U)
v(T )
+
v(T \ U)
v(T )
· Bi∗
B
) (
by Lemma 2 (b): r ·B < v(S(r)))
≤v(S(r)) ·
[
1 +
v(U)
v(T )
]
+
v(T \ U)
v(T )
· (2 · vi∗ − v(T ))
(
since Bi∗ ≤ 2 · vi
∗ − v(T )
v(S(r))
· B
)
=3 · vi∗ + v(U) ·
(
2− vi∗
v(T )
) (
since v(S(r)) = vi∗ + v(T )
)
≤3 · vi∗ + 3 · v(U) = 3 · alg.
[Case (3c) that ci∗ > Bi∗]. By Lemma 2 (a), ci∗ ≤ vi∗r , and ci ≤ vir for all item i ∈ T .
Because Bi∗ < ci∗ ≤ vi∗r , we have Bi∗ = 2·vi∗−v(T )v(S(r)) · B. The winning set W = T , which means
alg = v(T ). Hence,
fopt ≤ v(S(r)) + r · (B − c(S(r))) (by Lemma 2 (c))
≤ v(S(r)) + r · (B −Bi∗) (since c(S(r)) ≥ ci∗ > Bi∗)
≤ v(S(r)) · (2−Bi∗/B) (by Lemma 2 (b): r · B < v(S(r)))
= 3 · v(T ) = 3 · alg.
(
since Bi∗ =
2 · vi∗ − v(T )
v(S(r))
· B
)
Thus, 3 · alg ≥ fopt holds in all cases, which concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
4.1 Matching Lower Bound
It turns out that our DETERMINISTIC-MECHANISM reaches the best possible approximation ratio
among all deterministic mechanisms, against the Fractional Knapsack benchmark. Here, we give
an instance similar in spirit to the example of Singer [Sin10, Proposition 5.2] with a matching
lower bound of 3.
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Theorem 2. No deterministic mechanism (truthful, individually rational and budget-feasible) has
an approximation ratio less than 3 against the Fractional Knapsack benchmark, even if there are
only three items.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is a (3− ǫ)-approximation deterministic
mechanism, for some constant ǫ > 0. Consider the following two scenarios with three items
having values v1 = v2 = v3 = 1. Let c
∗ def= B2−ǫ/2 .
• [With costs (c∗, c∗, c∗)]. Based on individual rationality, each winning item gains a
payment of at least c∗. To guarantee the promised approximation ratio of (3 − ǫ) under
budget feasibility, there is exactly one winning item; without loss of generality, we assume
that the winner is the first item.
• [With costs (0, c∗, c∗)]. By truthfulness, item 1 wins once again, getting the same pay-
ment of at least c∗. Thus, the budget left is at most (B−c∗) < c∗. Due to budget feasibility
and individual rationality, neither item 2 nor item 3 can win.
In the later scenario, the mechanism generates value alg = 1, yet the Fractional Knapsack bench-
mark achieves value fopt = 1 + Bc∗ = 3 − ǫ2 > 3 − ǫ. This contradicts our assumption that the
mechanism is (3− ǫ)-approximation, concluding the proof of the theorem.
5 Main Result: Randomized Mechanism
Next, we present the main result of our work, a randomized mechanism that achieves a 2-
approximation to the Fractional Knapsack benchmark. Given the matching lower bound by Chen
et al. [CGL11, Theorem 4.2] against the weaker Knapsack benchmark, this approximation guar-
antee is tight for both benchmarks. Our mechanism described below and called RANDOMIZED-
MECHANISM receives pair (r, S(r)) from PRUNING-MECHANISM as input, and runs in the sec-
ond stage of the composition. The mechanism simply randomizes among non-adaptive pricing
schemes.
RANDOMIZED-MECHANISM(r, S(r))
(1) Let q
def
= 12 · v(S(r))−r·Bmin{vi∗ ,v(T )}
(2) If vi∗ ≤ v(T ), let qi∗ def= 12 − q and qT
def
= 12
(3) Else, let qi∗
def
= 12 and qT
def
= 12 − q
(4) Offer pricea Bi∗ to item i
∗, where Bi∗ is defined as follows:
(a) With probability qi∗, let Bi∗
def
= vi∗r
(b) With probability qT, let Bi∗
def
= B − v(T )r
(c) With probability q, draw Bi∗ ∼ Uniform
[
B − v(T )r , vi∗r
]
(5) Offer price Bi
def
= viv(T ) · (B −Bi∗) to each item i ∈ T
aFor all item i ∈ S(r), price Bi is well defined in range
[
0, vi
r
] ⊆ [0, B], by Lemma 2 (a).
We first verify that all quantities in RANDOMIZED-MECHANISM are well defined.
Lemma 3. 0 ≤ q = 12 · v(S(r))−r·Bmin{vi∗ ,v(T )} ≤
1
2 and 0 ≤ B − v(T )r < vi∗r .
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Proof. The first inequality is due to Lemma 2 (b) that v(S(r)) > r ·B. Lemma 2 further implies
r · B ≥ vi∗ and r · B ≥ v(T ), i.e., r · B ≥ max
{
vi∗ , v(T )
}
. Now, the second inequality in
Lemma 3 follows, as q = 12 · vi∗+v(T )−r·Bmin{vi∗ ,v(T )} ≤
1
2 · vi∗+v(T )−max{vi∗ ,v(T )}min{vi∗ ,v(T )} =
1
2 . Finally, rearranging
v(T ) ≤ r ·B < v(S(r)) = vi∗ + v(T ) leads to the last two inequalities.
Similar to DETERMINISTIC-MECHANISM in Section 4, we also slightly abuse notations and
also refer to RANDOMIZED-MECHANISM as the composition of two mechanisms: PRUNING-
MECHANISM with RANDOMIZED-MECHANISM.
Theorem 3. RANDOMIZED-MECHANISM is a 2-approximation mechanism (individually rational,
budget-feasible, and universally truthful) against the Fractional Knapsack benchmark.
Proof. Since RANDOMIZED-MECHANISM is a pricing scheme, it is individually rational; since
each random realization of the prices (Bi)i∈S(r) is budget-feasible, i.e.,
∑
i∈S(r)Bi = B by
construction, the mechanism is also budget-feasible. Note that (1) all random choices in
RANDOMIZED-MECHANISM, i.e., the prices (Bi)i∈S(r), can be made before execution of the mech-
anism; and (2) for each such choice, the resulting pricing mechanism is obviously truthful. Due
to Lemma 1, all desired properties extend to the composition mechanism, hence being individ-
ually rational, budget-feasible, and universally truthful.
In the rest of the proof, we show that RANDOMIZED-MECHANISM is a 2-approximation to fopt.
Let (xi)i∈S(r) denote the allocation probabilities, then the mechanism generates an expected
value of alg =
∑
i∈S(r) vi · xi. In order to prove the approximation guarantee, we need the
following equation (2), inequality (3), and inequality (4), which will be proved later.
r · B = 2 · qi∗ · vi∗ + 2 · qT · v(T ), (2)
vi∗ · xi∗ ≥ qi∗ · vi∗ + 1
2
· (vi∗ − r · ci∗), (3)
vi · xi ≥ qT · vi + 1
2
· (vi − r · ci), ∀i ∈ T. (4)
Indeed, these mathematical facts together with Lemma 2 (c) imply that 2 · alg ≥ fopt.
fopt ≤ v(S) + r · (B − c(S))
(2)
=
(
vi∗ + v(T )
)
+ 2 · (qi∗ · vi∗ + qT · v(T ))− r · (ci∗ + c(T ))
(3,4)
≤ 2 · vi∗ · xi∗ + 2 ·
∑
i∈T
vi · xi = 2 · alg.
Now, we are only left to prove equation (2), inequality (3) and inequality (4).
[Equality (2)]. By the definitions of qi∗ and qT , in either case of Step (2) or Step (3),
qi∗ · vi∗ + qT · v(T ) = vi
∗ + v(T )
2
− q ·min{vi∗ , v(T )}
=
vi∗ + v(T )
2
− v(S(r)) − r · B
2
=
r · B
2
. (by the definition of q)
[Inequality (3)]. It is equivalent to showing that Pr[Bi∗ ≥ ci∗ ] = xi∗ ≥ qi∗ + vi∗−r·ci∗2·vi∗ .
• [When ci∗ ≤ B − v(T )r ]. Item i∗ always accepts price Bi∗ , i.e., Pr[Bi∗ ≥ ci∗ ] = 1, which
gives us the desired bound of 1 ≥ qi∗ + vi∗−r·ci∗2·vi∗ , because qi∗ ≤
1
2 .
• [When ci∗ > B − v(T )r ]. By Lemma 2 (a), vi∗r ≥ ci∗ . We consider the random events in
Step (4a) that Bi∗ =
vi∗
r and in Step (4c) that Bi∗ ∼ Uniform
[
B − v(T )r , vi∗r
]
. Since
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Pr[Step (4a)] = qi∗ and Pr[Step (4c)] = q, putting everything together gives
Pr [Bi∗ ≥ ci∗ ] = qi∗ + q · vi
∗/r − ci∗
vi∗/r −
(
B − v(T )/r)
(
since vi∗/r ≥ ci∗
)
= qi∗ +
1
2
· vi∗ − r · ci∗
min{vi∗ , v(T )} (by the definition of q)
≥ qi∗ + vi
∗ − r · ci∗
2 · vi∗ .
(
since vi∗/r ≥ ci∗
)
[Inequality (4)]. The argument is similar to the above. For each item i ∈ T , we claim that
Pr[Bi ≥ ci] = xi ≥ qT + vi−r·ci2·vi .
• [When ci ≤ viv(T ) ·
(
B − vi∗r
)
]. Item i always accepts price Bi, i.e., Pr[Bi ≥ ci] = 1, which
gives us the desired bound of 1 ≥ qT + vi−r·ci2·vi , in that qT ≤ 12 .
• [When ci > viv(T ) ·
(
B − vi∗r
)
]. By Step (5), Bi ≥ ci if and only if Bi∗ ≤ B − v(T ) · civi .
We consider the random events in Step (4b) that Bi∗ = B − v(T )r and in Step (4c) that
Bi∗ ∼ Uniform
[
B − v(T )r , vi∗r
]
. As Pr[Step (4b)] = qT and Pr[Step (4c)] = q,
Pr [Bi ≥ ci] = qT + q ·
(
B − v(T ) · civi
)− (B − v(T )r )
vi∗/r −
(
B − v(T )/r)
= qT + q · v(T )
v(S(r)) − r ·B ·
vi − r · ci
vi
(
since v(S(r)) = vi∗ + v(T )
)
= qT +
v(T )
2 ·min{vi∗ , v(T )} ·
vi − r · ci
vi
(
by the definition of q
)
≥ qT + vi − r · ci
2 · vi ,
(
by Lemma 2 (a):
vi
r
≥ ci
)
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
6 Conclusion and Open Question
In this work, we proposed a budget-feasible randomized mechanism with the best possible
approximation guarantee for the additive buyer. In addition, our deterministic mechanism still
leaves some room for improvement: the best possible approximation guarantee is somewhere
between
[√
2 + 1, 3
]
. However, our instance from Theorem 2 clearly demonstrates that quite
a different approach that is specifically tailored to the real Knapsack optimum (rather than the
fractional relaxation solution) is needed.
The class of additive valuations is the most basic class of valuations in the research agenda
for budget-feasible mechanisms. We hope that our results may lead to new mechanisms and im-
proved analysis for more general valuation classes. Indeed, given the same factor 2-approximation
result of [BCGL17] for the promise version of the problem for a subadditive buyer, we are even
so bold as to conjecture that the true approximation guarantee for a subadditive buyer is still 2
(leaving all computational considerations aside).
Our composition approach has a lot of resemblance to the pruning ideas from the frugality
literature. This demonstrates that ideas and approaches from one area of reverse auction design
might be beneficial to another. We believe that there could be more interesting connections
between these two complementary agendas.
Finally, our mechanisms use posted-prices in the second stage. Besides the practical inter-
est and motivation of posted-pricing mechanisms in the prior work, our work gives additional
support to study this family of mechanisms in budget-feasible framework from a theoretical
viewpoint.
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